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Private Meetings Between Firm Managers
and Outside Investors:
The European Paradigm
GIOVANNI STRAMPELLI*

ABSTRACT
Institutional ownership of listed companies has grown significantly,
leading to an increase in ownership concentration in the European Union.
Under the current context of re-concentrated ownership, institutional
shareholders are expected, also in Europe, to play a more active role in
corporate governance and to exert influence on the company’s strategies.
Within such a corporate governance landscape institutional investor
engagement is becoming a distinctive feature of corporate governance of
European listed companies. In particular, board-shareholder dialogue is a
key engagement tool and is essential in order to enable institutional investors
to fulfil their stewardship functions. Board-shareholder dialogue is also core
to listed companies’ communication strategies, since the growing demand
for engagement by institutional investors has rendered traditional investor
relations insufficient. Nevertheless, private meetings between directors and
institutional investors raise concerns with respect to the financial markets
law framework in the EU. In particular, the EU market abuse regime and
the related principle of equal treatment for shareholders seem to hinder
dialogue between directors and key shareholders. Against this background
this Article shows that legal constraints deriving from EU financial markets
law do not hamper institutional investor engagement. Furthermore, based
on recommendations from corporate governance and stewardship codes as
well as good practice standards drafted by corporate governance experts
and institutions, it outlines an innovative practical framework that reduces
the risk of violating disclosure rules and fosters board-shareholder
engagement. In doing so, the Article provides theoretical and practical
insights that can help to make institutional investor engagement more
effective also in non-European countries.

*Professor of Business Law, Director of the PhD in Legal Studies, Bocconi University, Milan.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Starting from the 1990s in the Unites States, and more recently in
Europe, institutional ownership of listed companies has grown significantly,
leading to an increase in ownership concentration.1 Under the current context
of re-concentrated ownership in Europe, institutional shareholders are
expected to play a more active role in corporate governance and to exert
influence on the company’s strategies.2 According to the SRD II:
Effective and sustainable shareholder engagement is one of the
cornerstones of the corporate governance model of listed companies,
which depends on checks and balances between the different organs and
different stakeholders. Greater involvement of shareholders in corporate
governance is one of the levers that can help improve the financial and
non-financial performance of companies, including as regards
environmental, social and governance factors, in particular as referred to
in the Principles for Responsible Investment, supported by the United
Nations.3

In particular, as far as the role of the institutional investors is concerned,
although it recognizes that “the experience of the last years has shown that
institutional investors and asset managers often do not engage with
companies in which they hold shares”,4 the SRD II emphasizes that
“[i]nstitutional investors and asset managers are often important
shareholders of listed companies in the Union and can therefore play an
important role in the corporate governance of those companies, but also more
generally with regard to their strategy and long-term performance”.5
Within such a context, institutional investors are expected to actively
monitor their investee companies. For example, according to the EFAMA

1. See A. DE LA CRUZ ET AL., OWNERS OF THE WORLD’S LISTED COMPANIES 9-13 (2019),
www.oecd.org/corporate/Owners-of-the-Worlds-Listed-Companies.htm. See also Ronald J. Gilson &
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of
Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 864–68 (2013); Edward Rock, Institutional Investors in
Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 365
(Jeffrey Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2015).
2. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas, The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate
Governance and Corporate Litigation, 61 VAND. L. REV. 299, 300 (2008) (highlighting that “[t]he theory
was simple: if shareholder monitoring could limit managers’ divergence from the goal of shareholder
wealth maximization, then institutional shareholders were well positioned to act as effective monitors.
Institutions held larger blocks of stock than most other investors and collectively held well over fifty
percent of the stock of most large public companies. Acting together, these shareholders would have the
power and the incentives to push for good corporate governance and to nudge managers to pursue wealthmaximizing strategies”).
3. Directive 2017/828, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 Amending
Directive 2007/36/EC as Regards the Encouragement of Long-Term Shareholder Engagement, 2017 O.J.
(L 132/1) 3 [hereinafter SRD II]), recital 14.
4. Id., recital 15.
5. Id.
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Stewardship code,6 “asset managers may seek to preserve and enhance value
in the companies they invest in, through exercise of voting rights and
engagement”. Indeed, even though broader definitions are accepted,7
institutional investors’ stewardship activities encompass both voting and
engagement. Namely, according to the EFAMA Code, Stewardship is
defined as
engagement, i.e. the monitoring of and interaction, with investee
companies, as well as exercising voting rights attached to shares.
Engagement can be on matters such as: business strategy and its execution;
risk management; environmental and social concerns; corporate
governance issues such as board composition and the election of
independent directors, together with executive remuneration; compliance,
culture and ethics; and performance and capital structure.8

Against this background, the following analysis will focus on
interactions between issuers and institutional investors, that is the so-called
board-institutional investors engagement. As stated by the EFAMA Code,
contacts with a single or several board members of investee companies can
consist in unilateral communication from institutional investors to board
members (one-way engagement), or in bilateral dialogue (two-way
engagement). Namely, “[i]n a one-way engagement, asset managers present
their perspective regarding specific issues to board members of investee
companies, who in turn do not communicate any information”. Differently,
during a bi-way engagement, “an exchange of information should take place
between asset managers and board members of investee companies”.9
Calls from institutional investors for engagement with the board have
grown. Private dialogue (“behind the scenes”) with directors is an important

6. Eur. Fund & Asset Mgmt. Ass’n, EFAMA Stewardship Code (2018) [hereinafter EFAMA
Code],
https://www.efama.org/newsroom/news/efama-stewardship-code-principles-asset-managersmonitoring-voting-engagement.The EFAMA Code played a major role in developing board-shareholder
engagement at the EU level by inspiring some stewardship codes adopted at national level. See, e.g.,
Assogestioni, Italian Stewardship Principles (2016) [hereinafter Italian Stewardship Principles],
https://ecgi.global/code/italian-stewardship-principles-2016 (recognizing that “[t]he adopted Principles
are inspired by those contained in the EFAMA Code for External Governance, approved by the European
Fund and Asset Management Association, of which Assogestioni is a member).
7. See Eur. Sec Mkt. Auth., Undue short-term pressure on corporations 55 (ESMA30-22-762) (Dec.
18,
2019),
https://www.esma.europa.eu/document/report-undue-short-term-pressure-corporationsfinancial-sector (noting that “[e]ngagement strategies can be classified according to three broad
categories, namely (i) engaging in private conversations with management and the board; (ii) exercising
voting rights at companies’ shareholder meetings and (iii) proposing resolutions at companies’
shareholder meetings (so-called shareholder proposals). Yet, there is some fluidity around the term. Some
consider engagement to be limited to behind-the- scene interactions, while others have a broader
interpretation and consider that for example exit, takeover and publicly voicing displeasure constitute
engagement strategies”).
8. Id. at 8.
9. EFAMA CODE, supra note 6, at 7.
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instrument of institutional investor activism10 As recognised also by the
ESMA,11 whilst due to their informal nature the precise extent of private
meetings between institutional investors and directors is not easy to
estimate,12 available empirical analysis shows that private discussions with
directors have become one of the most popular measures of shareholder
engagement by institutional investors,13 and that other public mechanisms
(such as shareholder proposals or public criticism) are used only if
interventions behind the scenes fail14 This is because, as further studies
suggest, private meetings with a company’s directors and its management
(and, more generally, activism behind the scenes) can create value and have
an effective impact on issuers’ decisions.15
10. See ESMA, supra note 7, at 55 (staring that “individual or collective dialogue between
shareholders and management is an increasingly important form of engagement. Attempts by institutional
investors to engage with the board have grown over time and private dialogue with directors is now an
important instrument of institutional investor activism”). See also Klaus J. Hopt, The Dialogue Between
the Chairman of the Board and Investors: The Practice in the UK, the Netherlands and Germany and the
Future of the German Corporate Governance Code Under the New Chairman (European Corp.
Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 365/2017, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3030693; WolfGeorg Ringe, Shareholder Activism: A Renaissance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW
AND GOVERNANCE 407 (Jeffrey Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2015); Doron Levit, Soft Shareholder
Activism 2 (May 31, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1969475.; Matteo Tonello and Matteo Gatti, BoardShareholder Engagement Practices, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 30,
2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/12/30/board-shareholder-engagement-practices/.
11. ESMA, supra note 7, at 55 (noting that “empirical analysis shows that private discussions with
directors have become one of the most popular measures of shareholder engagement by institutional
investors”).
12. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Michael S. Weisbach, The State of Corporate Governance Research, 23
REV. FIN. STUD. 939, 942 (2010); Matthew J. Mallow & Jasmin Sethi, Engagement: The Missing Middle
Approach in the Bebchuck-Strine Debate, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 385, 396 (2016) (arguing that
“[e]ngagement often occurs privately-away from the scrutiny of the public and the media-and it is less
measurable than a shareholder vote. Consequently, empirical research on the effectiveness of engagement
is lacking”).
13. See Joseph A. McCahery et al., Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of
Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905, 2911–12 (2016) (showing that 63% of the institutional investors
surveyed have engaged in direct discussions with management); Elroy Dimson et al., Active
Ownership, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 3225, 3226 (2015); David Solomon & Eugene Soltes, What Are We
Meeting for? The Consequences of Private Meetings with Investors, 58 J.L. & ECON. 325, 326–28 (2015);
Stefano Cascino and al., Who Uses Financial Reports and for What Purpose? Evidence from Capital
Providers, [2014] 11 ACC. EUR. 185. See also the evidence provided by ESMA, supra note 7, at 61
(showing that private engagements are considered to be an important stewardship tool by a large number
of institutional investors).
14. See McCahery et al., supra note 13, at 2912; ESMA, supra note 7, at 56 (noting that, given the
negative signalling mechanism that the use of shareholder proposals or other “public” initiatives may
have, “investors typically try to engage with firms behind the scenes and prefer not to take public
measures, which may also explain why a high number of shareholder proposals are withdrawn before the
shareholder meeting”).
15. See Marco Becht et al., Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the
Hermes UK Focus Fund, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3093, 3097, 3108–18 (2009) (finding that “when the fund’s
engagement objectives are achieved, there are economically large and statistically significant positive
abnormal returns around the announcement date of the change”); Willard T. Carleton et al., The Influence
of Institutions on Corporate Governance Through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF, 53
J. FIN. 1335, 1336 (1998) (presenting empirical evidence concerning private contacts of the Teachers
Insurance Annuity Association–College Retirement Equities Fund’s contacts with investee companies).
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In spite of this favourable trend, board-shareholder engagement is still
problematic. Public disclosure and insider trading rules set legal constraints
on board-shareholder engagement. However, the reach of these constraints
should not be overstated, as they do not appear to ban outright any private
dialogue between directors and shareholders. In this regard,
recommendations within corporate governance and stewardship codes, and
from practitioners, play a major role in developing a practical framework for
director-shareholder dialogue that seeks to prevent the violation of insider
trading and public disclosure rules, and to make dialogue more effective.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part II will describe the increasing
practical relevance of board/shareholder engagement as a key stewardship
tool. Part III will provide an overview of potential legal constraints on
board/shareholder in Europe engagement and will show that legal constraints
deriving from selective disclosure and insider trading regime and the
principle of equal treatment of shareholders do not pose any absolute ban on
board-shareholder dialogue. Part IV will consider practical solutions that
could facilitate board-shareholder engagement in Europe and make it more
effective. Part V will conclude.

II. PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH MANAGEMENT AND THE BOARD AS
A KEY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS’ ENGAGEMENT TOOL
Over the last few years, due to increased calls for engagement from
institutional investors, directors have been increasingly engaging in dialogue
with them. Corporate governance and stewardship codes adopted in many
European Member States require institutional investors to intensify their
stewardship role over portfolio companies, and sets of recommendations are
being developed to make the process of director-shareholder engagement
more effective and compliant with the existing regulatory context.
The debate concerning board-shareholder engagement was initiated in
Europe by the European Commission’s Action Plan on European company
law and corporate governance,16 which resulted in the subsequent proposal
for a directive reforming the Shareholders Rights Directive of 2007.17 The
first draft of the amending directive included provisions concerning directorinstitutional shareholder dialogue, which have been maintained in the final
text of Directive 2017/828/EU amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards

16. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action Plan: European
Company Law and Corporate Governance – a Modern Legal Framework for More Engaged
Shareholders and Sustainable Companies, at 8, COM (2012) 740 final (Dec. 12, 2012).
17. See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as Regards the Encouragement of Long Term Shareholder Engagement
and Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards Certain Elements of the Corporate Governance Statement, COM
(2014) 213 final (Apr. 9, 2014).
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the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement.18 Namely, Recital
16 to the SRD II emphasizes that
Institutional investors and asset managers are often not transparent
about their investment strategies, their engagement policy and the
implementation thereof. Public disclosure of such information could have a
positive impact on investor awareness, enable ultimate beneficiaries such as
future pensioners optimise investment decisions, facilitate the dialogue
between companies and their shareholders, encourage shareholder
engagement and strengthen their accountability to stakeholders and to civil
society.
Against this backdrop, Article 3g SRD II provides that institutional
investors and asset managers shall, under a comply or explain-rule, develop
and publicly disclose an engagement policy that describes how they integrate
shareholder engagement in their investment strategy. The policy, among
other things, shall describe how institutional investors and asset managers
“conduct dialogues with investee companies”.19 Article 3j SRD II further
requires proxy advisors to disclose on an annual basis, among other things,
“whether they have dialogues with the companies which are the object of
their research, advice or voting recommendations and with the stakeholders
of the company, and, if so, the extent and nature thereof”.
The provisions laid down by the SRD II are relevant insofar as they
confirm that EU law favours dialogue between companies and their
shareholders, and promotes shareholder engagement by choosing a comply
or explain mechanism. As noted by the ESMA,
[o]ne of the assumptions underpinning the revision of Directive
2007/36/EC is that the monitoring role of shareholders is insufficient and
that engagement should be reinforced to reduce excessive focus on shortterm returns by management. This fundamental objective is highlighted in
the actual title of the revised directive which indicates that the
encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement is its key goal.20

Nevertheless, within the EU regulatory framework, board-institutional
shareholder dialogue is still in the main regulated by stewardship and
corporate governance codes adopted at the national level, which provide
18. SRD II, supra note 3, at recital 3.
19. Another reference to director-shareholder dialogue is included in recital 49 of the SRD II, which
recognizes that shareholders and investors can engage with the company on the implementation of the
remuneration policy. Due to the introduction of the “say-on-pay” vote executive compensation is a
privileged area of engagement both in the US and in Europe. See Joseph W. Yockey, On the Role and
Regulation of Private Negotiations in Governance, 61 S.C. L. REV. 171, 214-218 (2009); Randall S.
Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will it Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate
Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213, 1256 (2012) (noting that “[t]he say-on-pay votes mandated by
Dodd- Frank, in these commentators’ eyes, appear to have catalyzed greater management attention to
shareholder concerns, an increased shareholder interest in voting on corporate governance, and a broader
dialogue on pay issues between management and shareholders (and proxy advisory firms)”.
20. ESMA, supra note 7, at 53.
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companies and their shareholders with detailed guidelines on how to conduct
director-shareholder dialogue.21 Indeed, director-shareholder dialogue is
widely recognized as an important means of engagement by all main
stewardship codes.
According to the UK Stewardship Code 2020, signatories are expected
to engage with issuers to maintain or enhance the value of assets under
management and engagement methods include meeting the chair or other
board members, holding meetings with management.22 The EFAMA Code
includes a similar recommendation.23 Institutional investors should interact
with investee companies on an ongoing basis in order to protect and secure
value over the long term; initial discussions can entail, for example, meeting
with the chief executive officer, senior independent director, or the chair of
the supervisory board, as the case may be, or with other independent
directors or board members. More generally, when investors have concerns
about the company’s strategy and performance, the EFAMA Code
recommends that they should seek to ensure that the appropriate members of
an investee company’s board are made aware of them.
As far as issuers are concerned, the provisions of corporate governance
codes on director-shareholder dialogue are fundamental. The UK Corporate
Governance Code recommends that “[i]n addition to formal general
meetings, the chair should seek regular engagement with major shareholders
in order to understand their views on governance and performance against
the strategy. Committee chairs should seek engagement with shareholders
on significant matters related to their areas of responsibility. The chair should
ensure that the board as a whole has a clear understanding of the views of
shareholders” 24
Provisions similar to those contained in the UK Corporate Governance
Code can be found in corporate governance codes adopted in other Member
States. The 2020 Belgian Code on Corporate Governance recommends that
the board should “ensure an effective dialogue with shareholders and
potential shareholders through appropriate investor relation programmes, in
order to achieve a better understanding of their objectives and concerns” 25
and “encourage shareholders, and in particular, institutional investors, to
21. Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International
Regulation, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 10–14 (2011) (recognizing that corporate governance codes represent,
across several countries, a building block for the corporate governance regulatory framework).
22. Fin. Rep. Council, The UK Stewardship Code 2020 (Dec. 2019), 17,
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/5aae591d-d9d3-4cf4-814a-d14e156a1d87/StewardshipCode_Dec-19-Final.pdf.
23. EFAMA CODE, supra note 6, at 6-8.
24. See Fin. Reporting Council, The UK Corporate Governance Code 4 (2018), [hereinafter UK
Corporate
Governance
Code],
https://www.frc.org.uk/directors/corporate-governance-andstewardship/uk-corporate-governance-code.
25. Corp. Governance Comm., The Belgian 2020 Code on Corporate Governance 24 (2020)
[hereinafter
Belgian
Code
on
Corporate
Governance],
https://www.corporategovernancecommittee.be/en/over-de-code-2020/2020-belgian-code-corporategovernance.
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communicate their evaluation of the company’s corporate governance prior
to the general shareholders’ meetings and at least through participation in the
general shareholders’ meeting”.26 The Danish recommendations on
corporate governance are modelled along the same lines,27 stating that “the
management through ongoing dialogue and interaction ensures that
shareholders, investors and other stakeholders gain the relevant insight into
the company’s affairs, and that the board of directors obtains the possibility
of hearing and including their views in its work. any”.28 Director-shareholder
dialogue is also recommended under the Italian Corporate Governance Code,
according to which “[t]he board of directors promotes dialogue with
shareholders and other stakeholders which are relevant for the company, in
the most appropriate way” and to this end “the board of directors adopts and
describes in the corporate governance report a policy for managing dialogue
with the generality of shareholders, taking into account the engagement
policies adopted by institutional investors and asset managers”.29
Director-shareholder dialogue has been particularly discussed amongst
German scholars and practitioners.30 The debate focuses on dialogue
between shareholders and the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat), since closer
engagement with the supervisory board is considered to be crucial in
allowing institutional investors to perform an active role in the monitoring
of listed companies. Guiding Principles for dialogue between investors and
German supervisory boards, which were drafted by a group comprised of
academics and representatives of issuers and institutional investors, were
published in 201631 In addition, the German Corporate Governance Code
(Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex) – whose last update was approved

26. Id.
27. Danish Comm. on Corp. Governance, Danish Recommendations on Corporate Governance 10
(2020),
https://corporategovernance.dk/sites/default/files/media/anbefalinger_for_god_selskabsledelse_engelsk.
pdf.
28. Id. (further stating that “[t]he board of directors’ insight in the dialogue could for instance take
place through feedback from meetings held with shareholders, investors and other stakeholders or through
other regular reports from the executive management. The board of directors should, through its
chairperson, ensure a good and constructive relationship with the shareholders”).
29. Corp.
Governance
Comm.,
Corporate
Governance
Code
5-6
(2020),
https://www.borsaitaliana.it/comitato-corporate-governance/codice/2020eng.en.pdf.
30. See Hopt, supra note 22, at 4-6 (arguing that “[t]he reactions to the new suggestions of the Code
(and the Guiding Principles) have been mixed. The institutional investors and large corporations as well
as portions of the financial press and academia approved of them. Others, in particular other corporations,
lawyers and traditional academia, criticized them, some very harshly”).
31. Ger. Inv. Funds Ass’n, Guiding Principles for Dialogue Between Investors and German
Supervisory
Boards
(2016),
https://www.bvi.de/uploads/tx_news/2016_07_11_Guiding_Principles_for_Shareholder_Communicatio
ns_with_Supervisory_Board.pdf.
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in December 2019 –32 includes a “suggestion”33 (introduced in 201734)
according to which “the Supervisory Board Chair should be available –
within reasonable limits – to discuss Supervisory Board-related issues with
investors”.35
In conclusion, an overview of the European regulatory framework
clearly shows that private dialogue between directors and shareholders is a
common (and progressively growing) practice, which is strongly
recommended by both legislators and corporate governance best practices as
an important tool for institutional investor engagement.

III. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON BOARD-SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT
In spite of the fact that director-institutional investor dialogue is
recognized as an essential element of the system of corporate governance for
listed companies, a not negligible number of issuers and investors have
voiced concerns about the economic and legal impediments to engagement.
Amongst the economic impediments, time and resource constraints, along
with an “unwillingness to talk”, seem to be of primary importance.36 From
32. Regierungskommission, Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 4 (2019) [hereinafter German
Corporate
Governance
Code],
https://www.dcgk.de//files/dcgk/usercontent/en/download/code/191216_German_Corporate_Governanc
e_Code.pdf.
33. See Hopt, supra note 22, at 5 (noting that “[t]he original proposal of the Commission went further
than the present version in one important point. The Code distinguishes sharply between ‘shall’ (‘soll’),
as found in the proposal, and “should” (‘sollte’), as found in the present version the first case this would
have been a ‘recommendation’ which, while of course not binding, would nevertheless have required that
any deviation from it must be disclosed under § 161 of the Stock Corporation Act. The present version
has been softened to a mere ‘suggestion’, which the board might consider but which it can drop without
further ado and without having to disclose this fact”). In fact, as explained by the introductory notes of
the German Corporate Governance Code, recommendations of the Code are indicated in the text by using
the word ‘shall’. Corporations may depart from recommendations, but in this case they are obliged to
disclose and explain any departures each year (comply or explain). This enables corporations to reflect
sector- or company-specific requirements. Well-justified departures from recommendations of the Code
may be in the best interests of good corporate governance. Thus, the Code contributes to greater flexibility
and more self-regulation in the German corporate constitution. Additionally, the Code contains
suggestions from which corporations may depart without disclosure; suggestions are indicated in the text
by using the word ‘should’). The remaining passages of the Code that do not use these words relate to
descriptions of statutory requirements and explanations. See GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE,
supra note 32, at 2.
34. The 2019 version of the German Corporate Governance Code will enter into force only after the
adoption of the Act for Implementing the Second EU Shareholder Rights Directive (“ARUG II”). The
Code version dated 7 February 2017 acts as the basis of the Declaration of Compliance until the new
Code has been published in the German Federal Gazette.
35. GER. INV. FUNDS ASS’N, supra note 32, at 5. The recommendation adopted in the revised
German Corporate Governance Code is shorter than that included in an earlier draft of October 2016,
according to which “under appropriate conditions, the Chairman of the Supervisory Board shall be
prepared to engage into discussions with investors on Supervisory Board-related topics. These are items
resting in the sole responsibility of the Supervisory Board thus exclusively to be decided by the latter.
Discussions on aspects, which are to be decided jointly by the Management Board and the Supervisory
Board, shall be led solely by the Management Board or by the Chairman of the Supervisory Board
together with the Management Board”.
36. See Dimson, supra note 13, at 29-31. See also ESMA, supra note 7, at 64.
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the legal standpoint, director-shareholder dialogue can cause non-public
information to be selectively disclosed, and the Market Abuse regime and
the principle of equal treatment have been the main sources of constraint for
dialogue within the European legal framework.37
Nevertheless, this Part will show that the role of such (potential) legal
constraints should not be overstated, as they only apply to the
communication of material non-public information and do not hinder
dialogue that does not reach the threshold of materiality, as long as such
communication does not involve inside information. When performing their
stewardship functions, institutional investors are primarily interested in
communicating their views, or concerns, to investee companies, and do not
wish to receive material non-public information so that they can freely trade
securities issued by investee companies.
A. SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE AND INSIDER TRADING REGIME
Due to its approach to insider trading based on the principle of equal
access to information, the European market abuse regime provided for under
the Market Abuse Regulation38 seems to place a strict constraint on directorinstitutional shareholder engagement.
According to the parity of information principle, Article 17 MAR sets
out an issuers’ obligation to promptly disclose inside information,39 stating
that “[a]n issuer shall inform the public as soon as possible of inside
information which directly concerns that issuer”. Article 7 MAR defines
inside information as “information of a precise nature, which has not been
made public, relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers or to one
or more financial instruments, and which, if it were made public, would be
likely to have a significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments
or on the price of related derivative financial instruments”. The rationale
37. See McCahery et al., supra note 13, at 2920-2922; Goldstein, supra note 13, at 29-31 Lisa M.
Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, U. ILL. L. REV 821, 834-838 (2013); Yockey,
supra note 19, at 205-214. See also ESMA, supra note 7, at 64.
38. See Marco Ventoruzzo, Comparing Insider Trading in the United States and in the European
Union: History and Recent Developments, 11 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 554, 571 (2014)
(highlighting that there is no general duty to disclose all material information under US law and this
feature of the American system can be pointed out as a major comparative difference with the current
European approach). However, the SEC requires issuers to disclose, by filing a Form 8-K, ‘on a rapid
and current basis’ material information regarding a wide list of events. Thus, the distinction between US
and EU regime is in practice less significant than might at first seem. See, e.g., JOHN ARMOUR ET AL.,
PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 175–76 (2016) (noting that “[t]he distinction between the two
regimes at first blush appears to be that the US mandates ongoing disclosure in relation to any of a
specified list of events, whereas the EU does not specify the events which trigger disclosure, rather
looking to the consequence of events on the stock price. However, the distinction in practice may be
rather more modest”).
39. Ventoruzzo, supra note 39, at 581-582 (pointing out that “[t]he default rule in Europe, therefore,
is that inside information should be promptly disclosed to the market. This is interesting because it
suggests that European law does not accept the principle that inside information belongs to the issuer and
can be misappropriated by insiders, but rather that it “belongs” to all investors and, as a general matter,
should be shared with the investing public”).
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underlying the mandatory disclosure rule is clearly presented by recital 49 to
the MAR, according to which issuers are required to inform the public as
soon as possible of any inside information because “the public disclosure of
inside information by an issuer is essential to avoid insider dealing and
ensure that investors are not misled”.40
The European market abuse regime seems to be averse to boardshareholder engagement also in another respect. Article 8 MAR lays down
an absolute prohibition on insider dealing, according to which inside
information cannot be used “by acquiring or disposing of, for its own account
or for the account of a third party, directly or indirectly, financial instruments
to which that information relates”. This rule applies to any person who
possesses inside information as a result of: (a) being a member of the
administrative, management or supervisory bodies of the issuer or emission
allowance market participant; (b) having a holding in the capital of the issuer
or emission allowance market participant; (c) having access to the
information through the exercise of an employment, profession or duties; or
(d) being involved in criminal activities. Article 8 also applies to any person
who possesses inside information under circumstances other than those
referred to in the first subparagraph where that person knows or ought to
know that it is inside information.
Article 8 MAR makes it clear that the EU insider trading regime does
not require that there be a fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship, or a duty
of trust or confidence, between the source the information and the recipient
of the information. According to the theory of equal access to information,
the prohibition on trading on the basis of material non-public information set
out by the MAR is absolute in nature, irrespective of how such information
is obtained.41 In keeping with Article 8(4) MAR, in order to enforce the rules
on insider trading it is only necessary to demonstrate that the recipient of the
information knows, or ought to know, that information constitutes inside
information.
Thus, it appears that the general prohibition against trading on the basis
of material non-public information laid down by Article 8 MAR can have a
significant impact on dialogue between directors and institutional
shareholders. Specifically, the market abuse regime set out by the MAR may
discourage institutional investors from engaging with directors, as they are
40. Sergio Gilotta, The Regulation of Outsider Trading in EU and the US, 13 EUR. COMPANY & FIN.
L. REV. 631, 638 (2016) (recalling that “EU law does not make all the subtle distinctions that the US legal
system makes and takes a sharp egalitarian stance toward informed trading by outsiders. It prohibits all
trading that is carried out on the basis of material non-public information, without giving much relevance
as to whether the trader qualifies as an insider or an outsider, or how precisely he obtained the
information”).
41. According to Article 10 (1) of the MAR “for the purposes of this Regulation, unlawful disclosure
of inside information arises where a person possesses inside information and discloses that information
to any other person, except where the disclosure is made in the normal exercise of an employment, a
profession or duties”. Commission Regulation 596/2014 of April 16, 2014, on market abuse regulation,
2014 O.J. 331 (L 173) 1.
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actually faced with a double risk. First, the Article 8 MAR prohibition on
trading usually represents an unacceptable burden for active institutional
investors, whose business model is based on the ability to trade. Secondly,
under the EU market abuse regime, shareholders that engage with directors
face the risk of being fined even if they asked not to receive inside
information, or if they are not actually aware of having received inside
information. Dialoguing with directors could (at least at first glance) turn
out to be a dangerous practice for shareholders in Europe.
However, concerns related to the MAR should not be overstated, as is
suggested by recital 19 to the MAR, which clearly affirms that:
This Regulation is not intended to prohibit discussions of a general nature
regarding the business and market developments between shareholders
and management concerning an issuer. Such relationships are essential for
the efficient functioning of markets and should not be prohibited by this
Regulation.

In fact, in spite of the general provisions of Articles 8 and 17 MAR, the
EU market abuse regime seems to leave enough room for directorshareholder dialogue, without exposing directors and shareholders to the risk
of infringing insider trading prohibitions and public disclosure obligations.
First of all, the duty to disclose set by Article 17 (1) MAR is not
absolute. Article 17 (8) MAR provides for an exception to the general ban
on selective disclosure by stating that:
Where an issuer, or a person acting on its behalf or for its account,
discloses any inside information to any third party in the normal course of
the exercise of an employment, profession or duties as referred to in
Article 10 (1)42, they must make complete and effective public disclosure
of that information, simultaneously in the case of an intentional disclosure,
and promptly in the case of a non-intentional disclosure. However, this
paragraph shall not apply if the person receiving the information owes a
duty of confidentiality, regardless of whether such duty is based on a law,
on regulations, on articles of association, or on a contract”.

In contrast to what might appear at first sight, Article 10 MAR does not
prohibit dialogue between directors and selected institutional investors.
Although the European Court of Justice has held that the selective disclosure
exemption laid down by Article 10 MAR must not be strictly interpreted,
according to the ECJ Grand Chamber’s decision in the Grøngaard and Bang
case,43 information is only considered to have been disclosed in the normal

42. Id.
43. Case C-384/02, Criminal proceedings against Knud Grøngaard and Allan Bang, EU:C:2005, at
para. 27 (stating that “[e]ven if that rule, having regard to the terms used, is capable of covering very
different situations, it must, as an exception to a general prohibition and in the light of the objective

250

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18:2

course of the exercise of an employment, profession or duties where there is
a close link between disclosure and the exercise of the employment,
profession or duties, and disclosure is strictly necessary for the exercise of
that employment, profession or duties. If this decision is considered in
greater detail, it is still unclear whether the disclosure of inside information
to key shareholders falls within the scope of the exemption provided for
under Article 10 MAR. However, when interpreting the exemption, it must
be considered that recital 19 to the MAR clearly favours director-shareholder
engagement. As has recently been pointed out by Hansen,
A too narrow interpretation of the exemption in Art 10 MAR runs the risk
of preventing active engagement by shareholders and should be avoided,
where the selective disclosure is reasonable and made in orderly
circumstances whereby the circle of recipients is known.44

Furthermore, pursuant to Article 17(8) MAR, directors are allowed to
disclose selectively material non-public information to recipients who have
signed a confidentiality agreement. If the recipient enters into such an
agreement, he/she is subject to the prohibition on trading laid down by
Article 8 MAR, and cannot use any inside information in his possession.
Thus, according to Article 10, when institutional investors agree to keep the
information received confidential, and not to trade on the basis of such
information, directors are allowed to freely dialogue with them and to
disclose (also) material non-public information.
Nevertheless, the confidentiality-based exemption under Article 10
MAR could at first glance appear to be quite unattractive for active
institutional investors, who usually want to be free to exit from investee
companies. According to Article 10 MAR, a recipient of selective inside
disclosures is definitely subject to the prohibition on trading the securities to
which the inside information refers. The selective disclosure regime could
therefore discourage institutional investors from engaging with directors.
However, as the trading ban only applies where inside information is
communicated, if the information disclosed during director-shareholder
dialogues is not material, institutional investors will be free to trade the
company’s shares.
In order to assess the compatibility of board-shareholder engagement
with the European market abuse regime, it is also worth noting that Article
11 MAR is comprised of specific provisions concerning market soundings,
i.e. interactions between a seller of financial instruments and one or more
potential investors prior to the announcement of a transaction in order to
gauge the interest of potential investors in a potential transaction and its
pricing, size and structuring. As recital 32 to the MAR explicitly
pursued by Directive 89/592, be interpreted strictly”). See, e.g., Jesper L. Hansen, Market Abuse Case
Law – Where Do We Stand With MAR?, 14 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 367, 373, 375 (2017).
44. HANSEN, supra note 43, at 374-375.

Summer 2022

PRIVATE MEETINGS

251

recognizes,45 market soundings are a highly valuable tool for enhancing
dialogue with shareholders, and measure their interest in participating in a
possible transaction (e.g. an issuance of additional equity).
As market soundings may entail the disclosure of inside information,46
Article 11 MAR requires that procedural safeguards be put in place in order
to prevent infringements of the market abuse regime. Pursuant to Articles
10(1) and 11(4) MAR, market soundings involving inside information
should be considered to be compliant with the market abuse regime only if
such information is disclosed during the normal course of the exercise of a
person’s employment, profession or duties. Disclosure of inside information
made in the course of a market sounding will be deemed to be made in such
a way only when issuers or other persons disclosing inside information
(“disclosing market participants”) comply with paragraphs Article 11(3) and
(5) MAR.47
45. See Recital 32 of the MAR (“[m]arket soundings are interactions between a seller of financial
instruments and one or more potential investors, prior to the announcement of a transaction, in order to
gauge the interest of potential investors in a possible transaction and its pricing, size and structuring.
Market soundings could involve an initial or secondary offer of relevant securities, and are distinct from
ordinary trading. They are a highly valuable tool to gauge the opinion of potential investors, enhance
shareholder dialogue, ensure that deals run smoothly, and that the views of issuers, existing shareholders
and potential new investors are aligned. They may be particularly beneficial when markets lack
confidence or a relevant benchmark, or are volatile. Thus, the ability to conduct market soundings is
important for the proper functioning of financial markets and market soundings should not in themselves
be regarded as market abuse”). Commission Regulation 596/2014 of April 16, 2014, on market abuse
regulation, 2014 O.J. 331 (L 173) 32.
46. Article 11(2)-(7) MAR recognizes that market soundings can entail disclosure of material nonpublic information, as explicitly confirmed also by the recital 34 to the MAR stating that “[c]onducting
market soundings may require disclosure to potential investors of inside information. There will generally
only be the potential to benefit financially from trading on the basis of inside information passed in a
market sounding where there is an existing market in the financial instrument that is the subject of the
market sounding or in a related financial instrument. Given the timing of such discussions, it is possible
that inside information may be disclosed to the potential investor in the course of the market sounding
after a financial instrument has been admitted to trading on a regulated market or has been traded on an
MTF or an OTF. Before engaging in a market sounding, the disclosing market participant should assess
whether that market sounding will involve the disclosure of inside information”. However, market
soundings do not necessarily lead to a disclosure of inside information: see Stefano Lombardo & Federico
M. Mucciarelli, Market soundings: The Interaction Between Securities Regulation and Company Law in
the United Kingdom and Italy 20-21 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 362/2017,
2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3012183
47. See recital 35 to the MAR stating that “[i]nside information should be deemed as being disclosed
legitimately if it is disclosed in the normal course of the exercise of a person’s employment, profession
or duties. Where a market sounding involves the disclosure of inside information, the disclosing market
participant will be considered to be acting within the normal course of his employment, profession or
duties where, at the time of making the disclosure, he informs and receives the consent of the person to
whom the disclosure is made that he may be given inside information; that he will be restricted by the
provisions of this Regulation from trading or acting on that information; that reasonable steps must be
taken to protect the ongoing confidentiality of the information; and that he must inform the disclosing
market participant of the identities of all natural and legal persons to whom the information is disclosed
in the course of developing a response to the market sounding. The disclosing market participant should
also comply with the obligations, to be set out in detail in regulatory technical standards, regarding the
maintenance of records of information disclosed. There should be no presumption that market participants
that do not comply with this Regulation when conducting a market sounding have unlawfully disclosed
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Article 11 (3) requires that disclosing market participants, prior to
conducting a market sounding, specifically consider whether the market
sounding will involve disclosure of inside information, and to make a written
record of their conclusions and the reasons therefore. Moreover, in order to
ensure that market soundings do not violate insider trading rules, Article 11
provides that also the person receiving the market sounding shall assess for
itself whether it is in possession of inside information, or when it ceases to
be in possession of inside information. In order to prevent insider trading
rules (especially the trading ban associated) from applying to a person
receiving market soundings who is unwilling to receive inside information,
the disclosing market participant is requested to obtain prior consent to the
disclosure of inside information. If the person receiving the market sounding
consents to receiving material non-public information, insider trading rules
will apply to him/her. Thus, the person receiving market soundings is
prohibited from using that information by trading financial instruments to
which the inside information relates, and is obliged to keep the information
confidential.
Article 11(5) further requires disclosing market participants to keep
records (and to provide them to the competent authority upon request) of all
information given to persons receiving the market sounding, including
information given within the market sounding, the identity of the potential
investors to whom information has been disclosed, including but not limited
to the legal and natural persons acting on behalf of the potential investor, and
the date and time of each disclosure.
As has been made clear by the ESMA,48 the market soundings regime
only applies to communications that are intended to assess the interest of
potential investors in a possible transaction, and the conditions relating to it,
such as its potential size or pricing, but not to investor relations
communications generally. Therefore, the provisions of Article 11 MAR do
not directly apply to the broader area of director-shareholder dialogue
concerning governance or strategic issues, on which this article is focused.
Nevertheless, the market soundings regime seems to confirm indirectly
that the MAR leaves sufficient scope for director-shareholder dialogue. First
of all, recital 34 and Article 11 of the Regulation clearly show that persons
inside information but they should not be able to take advantage of the exemption given to those who
have complied with such provisions”.
See also Lombardo & Mucciarelli supra note 46, at 19 (noting that meeting the special procedural
conditions set in Article 11 is likely to replace the strict requirements for selective disclosure of inside
information set forth by the ECJ in Grøngaard).
48. European Securities and Markets Authority [ESMA], Discussion Paper, Policy Orientations on
Possible Implementing Measures Under the Market Abuse Regulation, ESMA/2013/1649, at para. 62
(Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/consultations/esma%E2%80%99s-policyorientations-possible-implementing-measures-under-market (highlighting that “[i]t is important to note
that the market soundings regime under MAR is not intended to inhibit relations between the issuer and
its investors. The regime only applies to communications intending to gauge the interest of potential
investors in a possible transaction and the conditions relating to it such as its potential size or pricing, and
not to investor relations communications more generally”).
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involved in market soundings are free to exchange non-material information,
and that the procedural safeguards outlined in Article 11 MAR are much
more significant where inside information is disclosed within market
soundings.49 This is consistent with the general approach of the MAR,
according to which the prohibition on insider trading and the public
disclosure obligation only apply to inside information, as defined in Article
7 MAR. Put differently, Article 11 seems to support that the view that the
communication of non-material information is by no means constrained by
the MAR.50
Secondly, although the market soundings regime only covers boardshareholder communications that are directed at gauging the interest of
potential investors in a possible transaction, the provisions of Article 11
MAR are useful in defining a legal framework applicable to directorshareholder dialogue that falls outside the scope of market soundings, on
which this article is focused. Specifically, there is a question as to whether,
in order to prevent possible breaches of market abuse law, the procedural
steps designed by Article 11 of the MAR may give rise to the same protective
effects if applied to director-shareholder dialogue concerning governance or
strategic issues. It would appear reasonable to answer this question in the
affirmative as the voluntary application of procedures set out in Article 11
MAR,51 which are aimed at preventing infringements of the market abuse
regime, can create a safer context for director-shareholder dialogue and
incentivize intuitional investors to engage with issuers.
In conclusion, the mandatory disclosure and insider dealing regime laid
down by the MAR only represents a relative constraint on directorshareholder dialogue, insofar as it prohibits directors from disclosing inside
information within private meetings with shareholders, unless shareholders
agree to sign a confidentiality agreement and abstain from trading financial
instruments to which inside information relates. Although they do give rise
to some problematic issues, and can discourage engagement by institutional
investors, these constraints should be scaled back. As noted before, investors
generally do not intend to receive inside information, since this would
49. See Lombardo & Mucciarelli supra note 46, at 20 (noting that “[i]n this case, the discloser faces
simplified duties regarding the minutes and the records that are to be kept. In particular, the discloser
should indicate that the recipient is about to receive information that ‘the disclosing market participant
considers not to be inside information’ and the recipient should consent to such disclosure on a ‘non-wallcrossed’ basis”).
50. HOPT, supra note 10, at 7 (pointing out that only director-shareholder dialogue concerning
inside information are prohibited by the MAR).
51. Director-shareholder dialogue concerning governance and strategic issues is clearly beyond the
scope of Article 11 MAR because, unlike market soundings, it is not intended to gauge interest in a
transaction. See generally Cleary Gottlieb, Market Abuse Regulation: A Balanced Approach to the Market
Sounding Regime’s Applicability in Capital Markets Transactions (June 26, 2017),
https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/cgsh/files/2017/publications/alert-memos/mar—a-balancedapproach-to-the-market-sounding-regimes-applicability-6-27-17.pdf
(highlighting that “[r]egular
outreach by an issuer to its existing investor base to keep it informed of notable developments (when no
transaction is planned) should not constitute a market sounding”).
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restrain their freedom in trading the securities concerned.52 During
engagement-related dialogue, institutional investors mainly seek to
communicate their opinions and concerns regarding corporate governance
matters, strategies or individual transactions. Although the MAR requires
that safeguards be established in order to prevent inside information from
being communicated, and this can increase compliance costs for both the
issuers and institutional investors, the European market abuse regime, as is
also apparent from practice, does not genuinely hinder dialogue between
directors and key shareholders.
B. THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL TREATMENT FOR SHAREHOLDERS
As mentioned above, one further hurdle that may hinder directorshareholder dialogue within the European context is the principle of equal
treatment for shareholders53 laid down by Article 17 of Directive
2004/109/EC,54 according to which “the company shall ensure equal
treatment for all shareholders who are in the same position”. Similarly,
Article 46 of Directive 2012/30/EU55 provides that “for the purposes of the
implementation of this Directive, the laws of the Member States shall ensure
equal treatment to all shareholders who are in the same position”. Although
with respect to equal treatment the European Court of Justice has rejected
the view that the existence of “certain provisions relating to the protection of
minority shareholders is not sufficient in itself to establish the existence of a
general principle of Community law, in particular if the scope of those
provisions is limited to rights which are well defined and certain”,56 Article
17 of Directive 2004/109/EC (and the corresponding national
implementation rules) is still viewed as a substantial constraint on boardshareholder engagement.57
Since director-shareholder dialogue may give rise to an informational
advantage for the shareholders involved, its compatibility with the equal
treatment principle is questionable. In spite of its relevance, the compatibility

52. See e.g. Eugene Soltes, What Can Managers Privately Disclose to Investors, 36 YALE J. REG.
BULLETIN 148, 149 (2018-2019).
53. HOPT, supra note 10, at 8-10.
54. Directive 2004/109 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the
Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information About Issuers Whose Securities
are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and Amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L
390/38).
55. Directive 2012/30 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on
Coordination of Safeguards Which, for the Protection of the Interests of Members and Others, are
Required by Member States of Companies Within the Meaning of the Second Paragraph of Article 54 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in Respect of the Formation of Public Limited
Liability Companies and the Maintenance and Alteration of their Capital, with a view to Making Such
Safeguards Equivalent, 2012 O.J. (L 315/74).
56. Case C-108/08, Audiolux SA v. Grp. Bruxelles Lambert SA (GBL), 2009 E.C.R. I- 09823
(ECLI:EU:C:2009:626). See also LOMBARDO & MUCCIARELLI supra note 46, at 35–36.
57. See Hopt, supra note 10, at 7
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of director-shareholder dialogue with selective disclosure has not been
seriously addressed in the literature, or by the courts.
One significant exception concerns a decision by the Danish Supreme
Court in the Vase case concerning an acquisition by merger by acquisition
where the directors had established contact with selected shareholders in
order to seek their views concerning the transaction.58 The compatibility of
private dialogue between directors and the relevant shareholders with the
principle of equal treatment of shareholders was questioned by a minority
shareholder who had bought the company’s shares in view of the takeover.
Some time later, as it seemed apparent that no takeover would take place, the
shareholder decided to sell his shares. However, a few days after he sold his
shares, the takeover bid was launched. The shareholder alleged that if he had
been informed about the future offer at the same time as the major
shareholders had been, he (as well as other minority shareholders who were
not involved in the dialogue that had taken place with key shareholders)
would have had the opportunity to take advantage of the positive market
price reaction to the takeover announcement.
The Danish Supreme Court did not accept the minority shareholder’s
view. Instead, it stated that directors can lawfully consult with the controlling
shareholder and with major shareholders. The case was decided on the basis
of two arguments. First, under the corporate governance model
characterizing Nordic public companies, the influence of controlling
shareholders is considered to be normal and “beneficial” for the company.
Therefore, dialogue with relevant shareholders is an ordinary and widely
accepted practice.59 Secondly, there had been no breach of the principle of
equal treatment of shareholders since this principle applies to shares, and not
to shareholders as such. As a shareholder’s “weight” within the company
depends on the number of shares it holds, not all shareholders are the same.
The Danish Supreme Court’s opinion is consistent with the wording of
Article 17 of Directive 2004/109/EC, which provides that only shareholders
“who are in the same position” should be treated in an equal manner.
Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that, under European company and
financial markets law, major shareholders cannot be considered to be in the
same position as retail investors with minimal holdings, and the directors
should be allowed to engage in dialogue with selected relevant shareholders.
Nonetheless, dialogue between directors and (significant) shareholder
is subject to limitations. As has recently been observed by Lombardo and
Mucciarelli,

58. A summary of the arguments made by the Danish Supreme Court’s in the Vase case is provided
by Jesper L. Hansen, The Role of Shareholders in Public Companies in the Nordic Countries, in GERMAN
AND NORDIC PERSPECTIVES ON COMPANY LAW AND CAPITAL MARKETS LAW 81, 86 (Holger Fleischer
et al. eds., 2015).
59. Hansen, supra note 43, at 375 (arguing that the Danish Supreme Court, in its decision in the
Vase case, held that selective and confidential disclosure from the board to major shareholders was
legitimate under the Danish system of corporate governance).

256

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18:2

Directors can never behave arbitrarily vis-à-vis their shareholders, and
even if discrimination is allowed, it is reasonable to expect that the
applicable company law regime requires such discrimination to be
supported by specific justifications for the benefit of the company as a
whole, although the precise contours of these limits on directors’ powers
may vary across jurisdictions.60

This leads us to a key issue, namely whether private meetings between
directors and selected shareholders are supported by specific justifications
for the benefit of the company as a whole. This issue has mainly been
addressed by German scholars within the intense debate that followed the
introduction into the German Corporate Governance Code of a specific
recommendation concerning dialogue between members of the supervisory
board and shareholders.61 According to the prevailing opinion, the principle
of the equal treatment of shareholders does not preclude dialogue with
relevant shareholders, including specifically with institutional investors,
provided there are objective reasons underlying the choice of investor that is
granted or offered meetings.62
Dialogue with relevant shareholders certainly benefits the company as
a whole where transactions are initiated that require shareholder approval, as
is typically the case for a capital increase.63 Were the company to announce
its intention to raise new capital without previously having sounded out its
major shareholders and having obtained their informal approval, there would
be a risk that the issuer might suffer losses in addition to reputational losses.
The failure to execute an announced capital increase can negatively impact
on market prices of the company’s shares, which would result in a loss for
its shareholders. The issue is clearly addressed by the market sounding
regime set out by the MAR. Article 11(2) MAR states that disclosure of
inside information by a person intending to make a takeover bid for the
securities of a company, or a merger with a company, to parties entitled to
the securities, shall also constitute a market sounding, provided that the
willingness of parties entitled to the securities to offer their securities is
reasonably required for the decision to make the takeover bid or merger.
The answer to the further question as to whether ongoing dialogue
between the directors and the relevant shareholders benefits the company as
a whole is less obvious64 Still, there are sound reasons for answering in the

60. LOMBARDO & MUCCIARELLI, supra note 46, at 35. See also Hopt, supra note 10, at 8.
61. See Part II above.
62. See GER. INV. FUNDS ASS’N, supra note 31, at Introduction.
63. See Hopt, supra note 10, at 9 (highlighting that “dialogue by the board with institutional investors
outside of the general assembly is justified if the board considers it to be in the interest of the corporation
and if no new material inside information is distributed to the public ahead of the ad hoc-disclosure”).
64. This issue was debated in some jurisdictions before the MAR entered into force, including the
possibility of deriving a general principle of the legitimacy of dialogue between the board and
(significant) shareholders from the recognized legitimacy of those entered into on specific occasions, in
particular in relation to capital increases and mergers. See for Germany, Hopt, supra note 10, at 9; see
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affirmative. As Hopt has observed, engaging in dialogue with relevant
shareholders, especially with institutional investors, is per se consistent with
the interests of the company, since sound investor relations are crucial for
listed companies.65 Therefore, any deviation from the principle of equal
treatment of shareholders for these purposes is not arbitrary, but legitimate.
Institutional shareholders and minority retail shareholders cannot be
considered to be in the same position, both due to the size of their holdings
as well as their attitude towards being active shareholders.66 Furthermore, the
overlap between private dialogues between directors and relevant
shareholders and the issuers’ interests is clearly apparent from SRD II, as
well as from the corporate governance codes mentioned above, both of which
encourage effective dialogue between directors and shareholders.67
Moreover according to the MAR the duty to ensure equal access to
information only applies to inside information.68 Similarly, the disclosure
obligation under Article 17 MAR only applies to inside information, as
defined under Article 7. Therefore, the MAR seems to confirm that a
principle of equal information is not absolute in nature.69 Rather, the MAR
allows institutional investors to gain an informative advantage from dialogue
with directors, as long as this does not entail the disclosure of inside
information.70 The same also applies when, if the information received from
directors is combined with further pieces of information to form a mosaic,
the shareholder concerned may arrive at material information.71
Consequently, neither two-way director-shareholder dialogue not involving
the disclosure of inside information nor “listen-only” sessions where
directors learn about the positions of institutional shareholders violate the
equal treatment principle under EU law.

Belgium, Koen Geens, Corporate Boards in Belgium, in CORPORATE BOARDS IN LAW AND PRACTICE
120, 148 (Paul Davies et al. eds., 2013).
65. Hopt, supra note 10, at 9.
66. Id. at 738.
67. See supra Part II.
68. Also the ECJ seems to recognize that the duty to ensure equal access to information only applies
to inside Also the ECJ seems to recognize that the duty to ensure equal access to information only applies
to inside information. See Case C-45/08, Spector Photo Grp. NV v. Commissie voor het Bank, Financieen Assurantiewezen, ECLI:EU:C:2009:806, ¶ 48 (noting that the purpose of insider trading prohibition
“is to ensure equality between the contracting parties in stock-market transactions by preventing one of
them who possesses inside information and who is, therefore, in an advantageous position vis-à-vis other
investors, from profiting from that information, to the detriment of those who are unaware of it”).
69. See Holger Fleischer, Investor Relations und informationelle Gleichbehandlung im Aktien-,
Konzern- und Kapitalmarktrecht, 38 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT
(ZGR) 505, 512-513 (2009).
70. Of course, directors can extend face-to-face contacts with major shareholders to other
shareholders if this is in the interest of the corporation. See Hopt, supra note 10, at 10 (noting also that,
according to the MAR, “[a]t a minimum all new material facts made available in such a dialogue must be
promptly disclosed” and arguing that “It may advisable to go further and to allow other shareholders
direct access to the dialogue, but this goes far and cannot yet be considered to be generally acknowledged
good corporate governance”).
71. See Fleischer, supra note 70, at 512-513.
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IV. DESIGNING A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR BOARD-SHAREHOLDER
ENGAGEMENT

As has been shown above, private meetings between directors and
institutional investors fly under the radar of the insider trading and disclosure
regime when (as normally occurs)72 they concern non-material information
and the disclosure of material non-public information within directorshareholder dialogue does not violate the mandatory disclosure and insider
trading regime where recipients agree to sign a confidentiality agreement. In
addition, it is worth noting that the risk of disclosing material information is
overcome where issuers only listen to shareholders’ opinions and concerns.73
Detecting the transfer of material information raises more substantial
problems within two-way dialogue. In this case, the issuers and institutional
investors involved seem to be exposed to significant compliance costs, even
if there is lack of recent empirical evidence demonstrating the level of
compliance costs associated with insider trading and public disclosure
rules.74 Moreover, participants in dialogue run the risk of infringing
disclosure obligations and insider trading prohibitions, and consequently
being fined. With the aim of reducing these potential drawbacks, issuers and
investors are recommended to adopt specific procedures in order to avoid the
communication of material non-public information. In this regard,
recommendations from corporate governance and stewardship codes, and
practitioners, play a major role as they assist in developing a practical
framework for safe director-shareholder dialogue and in making dialogue
more effective. Against this backdrop, this part focuses on three aspects that
are crucial for safe dialogue, concerning identification of both of the topics
to be discussed, and the participants involved, and the issuers’ adoption of a
policy defining the format and procedure for dialogue.
A. TOPICS FOR DIALOGUE
Selecting the issues for discussion is not problematic where the
shareholders involved agree to treat the information disclosed in confidence.
If this is the case, the MAR allow for the selective disclosure of inside
information. In the most prevalent case, where institutional investors are not
willing to sign confidentiality agreements and the entry into dialogue with
72. See Stefano Cascino et al., Who Uses Financial Reports and for What Purpose? Evidence from
Capital Providers, 11 ACCT. EUR. 185, 209 (2014) (empirical findings collected).
73. Stephen Davis & Stephen Alogna, Talking Governance: Board-Shareholder Communications
on Executive Compensation, YALE SCH. OF MGMT. 10 (2008), http://som.yale.edu/news/news/millsteinreport-board-shareholder-communication-next-frontier-governance.
74. See, e.g., for the U.S., See Richard H. Walzer, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Remarks Before the Rocky Mountain Securities Conference (May 18, 2001),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch492.htm (reporting that “a survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PwC) found that 57% of respondents have not incurred any incremental compliance costs in connection
with Regulation FD. Of the 43% who have incurred such costs, 90% reported that the costs were moderate
or low. In contrast, a study by the Securities Industry Association (SIA) finds that Regulation FD imposes
“significant costs . . . well in excess of those originally estimated by the SEC”).
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investee company directors could constrain their trading activity,75 it is
recommended that issuers only choose issues for which there is a lower risk
of the disclosure of inside information, and adopt specific precautionary
measures in order to prevent inside information from being disclosed during
private meetings with shareholders.
Specifically, in order to prevent breaches of insider trading rules,
participants should make it clear prior to entering into dialogue whether or
not they are willing to communicate, or receive, price sensitive information.
The Efama Stewardship code is very explicit in this respect, recommending
that institutional investors may not wish to receive inside information, and
expect that, absent their consent, issuers and their advisors avoid
communicating information that, according to the insider trading regime
outlined in the MAR, may constrain their ability to trade the issuers’ shares.76
Risks associated with the disclosure of inside information may also be
reduced by focusing on the timing of dialogue. For example, the Dutch
Corporate Governance Code recommends that meetings with financial
analysts – although the same is certainly also the case for dialogue with
shareholders – do not take place during the period immediately preceding
the publication of periodical financial information in order to prevent
information concerning the company’s economic performance during the
relevant reference period from being selectively disclosed.77 Further
precautionary measures that may be taken by issuers include the early
definition of the issues to be discussed and a check as to their materiality, as
well as participation of legal advisors in private meetings with shareholders.
As mentioned above, converging recommendations are contained in the
corporate governance codes adopted in various Member States. The UK
Corporate governance code recommends that the boards’ chair discusses
with relevant shareholders on corporate governance and strategy issues.78
The Belgian Code on Corporate Governance encourages shareholders,
especially institutional investors, to assess carefully the corporate
governance structure of investee companies.79 More detailed
recommendations are to be found in the Guiding principles for dialogue
between investors and German supervisory boards, according to which
75. See supra Part III.A.
76. EFAMA CODE supra note 6, at 5.
77. Dutch Corp. Governance Code Monitoring Comm., Dutch Corporate Governance Code § 4.2.3.
(2016), http://www.mccg.nl/?page=4738.
78. See supra note 24. Such a recommendation is in line with the empirical evidence illustrated by
ESMA, (showing that “ESG / sustainability related factors (20% - 41 respondents) and remuneration of
directors (19% - 39 respondents) were seen as the main topics for engagement, supra note, 7, at 62. Board
appointments (including board diversity, independency and tenure, 17% - 36 respondents) followed
together with decisions on pay-out policy (14% - 30 respondents). Finally related-party transactions were
flagged by less than 10% of the responses (20 respondents). Other topics mentioned as a means of
mitigating undue short-termism were long-term contracts for directors, company reporting and auditing,
appointment of minority directors, shareholder rights, climate change, oversight of strategy and risk, fraud
and corruption”).
79. BELGIAN CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 25, at 24.
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topics for dialogue depend on the directors involved.80 In relation to
members of the Supervisory Board (whose role is roughly comparable to that
of non-executive directors),81 the Guiding principles state that they should
only engage in dialogue with institutional shareholders concerning matters
falling under the Supervisory Board’s responsibilities, leaving all other
matters for discussion to the management board in its capacity of the
company’s legal representative.82 Thus, the composition of the supervisory
board, its appointment process, as well as its remuneration system, can be
discussed within dialogue. More specifically, dialogue may involve the
supervisory board’s report and matters raised in the corporate governance
report that are relevant for the supervisory board, the internal organization
of the supervisory board, the design of control and participation processes,
committee formation, as well as the supervisory board’s efficiency review,
and measures resulting from the review. The results of the efficiency review
regarding individual members of the supervisory board should not be
discussed. The requirement profile for management board members and the
division of duties therein may be discussed in the dialogue. In addition, the
remuneration system of the management board, contemplated changes,
possible suggestions for improvement, as well as interpretation and, if
applicable, the exercise of the discretionary powers of the supervisory board
pertaining to remuneration-related matters may also be discussed with
investors. On the other hand, specific proposals for elections to the
supervisory board, or proposals concerning individual candidates should not
be discussed. Furthermore, dialogue should not involve the development and
implementation of corporate strategies, since these are matters falling under
the responsibility of the management board. The supervisory board should
only explain to shareholders that its role is within the process of strategy
definition, and its assessment of its implementation.
Stewardship principles seem to provide less restrictive guidance, since
dialogue with shareholders is recommended on any issue of interest for
institutional investors. According to the UK Stewardship Code 2020,
institutional investors should engage with investee companies to maintain or
enhance the value of assets.83 Likewise, Italian Stewardship Principles
recommend that institutional investors intervene, for example, where they
have significant concerns regarding the strategy and performance of investee
issuers, their governance structure, or their approach to environmental and

80. See GER. INV. FUNDS ASS’N, supra note 31, at 3-4. See also Marcus Lutter, Stellungnahme zum
Vorschlag der Regierungskommission Ziff. 5.2 des Kodex um einen neuen Abs 2 (2016),
kttp://www.dcgk.de/en/consultations/commentsreceived.html?file=files/dcgk/usercontent/de/Konsultati
onen/2016/Stellungnahmen%202016/161213%20Stellungnahme%20Prof.%20Lutter.pdf.
81. Paul L. Davies & Klaus J. Hopt, Corporate Boards in Europe - Accountability and Convergence,
61 AM. J. COMP. L. 301, 309-315 (2013).
82. See supra note 80.
83. FRC, supra note 22, at 17.
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social issues.84 In spite of their wider approach, the provisions of stewardship
codes do not appear to result in an increased risk of violating the market
abuse regime. In fact, stewardship principles recommend that institutional
investors communicate their concerns to investee companies, and thereby
only refer to one-way dialogue, during which issuers do not communicate
information. This should exclude the risk of breaching the regulatory
framework.
The precautionary measures mentioned above should reduce the risks
associated with the disclosure of material non-public information within
director-shareholder dialogues. However, topic restrictions and the
predetermination of the format of dialogue could chill communication, and
convert the shareholder-board relationship into a lawyer-driven, sterile
interaction.85 Furthermore, in order to serve as effective monitors of
directors, institutional investors may find it necessary to exchange
information when interacting with directors, as is typically the case when
communicating their concerns regarding strategies or specific transactions.86
In order to avoid such a potential chilling effect National Supervisory
Authorities or the ESMA may consider the provision to boards and
shareholders of more detailed guidance concerning (corporate governance)
topics that can be discussed within board-shareholder dialogue. Even if such
a solution would not establish a proper safe harbour, it could help reduce (at
least in part) compliance costs for both issuers and institutional investors.
For example, in order to facilitate engagement on the part of
institutional investors that have a long-term horizon and can help mitigating
short-termism in financial markets, the ESMA could explicitly state that
dialogues concerning ESG matters generally do not lead to infringements of
market abuse regime.87
B. PARTICIPANTS IN DIALOGUE
Selecting the directors to be involved in dialogue with institutional
shareholders is another key aspect of the engagement process. Debate
currently focuses on the involvement of non-executive directors in dialogue
with relevant shareholders, it being acknowledged that executive directors
and managers play the role of leading shareholder engagement with respect
to operating performance, financial matters, strategic execution, and other
84. ITALIAN STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, para. 3 (highlighting that “[a]n intervention
may be found to be necessary regardless of the investment style and in order to protect the best interests
of the collective investment undertakings or portfolios managed”).
85. See Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97 CORNELL L. REV.
849, 905 (2012).
86. Yockey, supra note 19, at 206.
87. Interestingly, as far as the takeover regime is concerned, the ESMA seems to be willing to take
action in this area. Namely, the ESMA is intended to assess whether the ESMA White List of activities
that shareholders can cooperate on without the presumption of acting in concert under the Takeover Bids
Directive, “should explicitly include coordination activities among institutional investors in the area of
ESG risks in order to address potential obstacles to related engagement”. See supra note 7, at 68-69.
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operational and performance matters for which they are directly responsible.
Due to their monitoring role within the board, non-executive directors are
the preferred point of contact for institutional investors performing their
stewardship function.
European corporate governance codes stress that the chairperson of the
board should play a central role in board’s engagement with shareholders.88
The UK corporate governance code recommends that the chair should seek
regular engagement with major shareholders in order to understand their
views on governance and performance against the strategy, and ensure that
all directors are made aware of their major shareholders’ issues and
concerns.89 According to the German Guiding principles for dialogue
between investors and German supervisory boards, the board’s chair
represents the supervisory board in communications with investors and
informs the entire supervisory board members about the dialogue. The chair
is also entitled to decide whether to engage in specific dialogue. The central
role played by the board’s chair is underscored also by the suggestion A.3 of
the German Corporate Governance Code, which states that the chairperson
of the supervisory board should be available – within reasonable limits – to
discuss supervisory board-related issues with investors.
Furthermore, it is a mainstream view within Europe that directorshareholder dialogue should also involve non-executive directors other than
the board chair. Specifically, the lead independent director and the
chairpersons of the board’s committees should be involved where the board
deems it appropriate, or if requested by the shareholders. The UK Corporate
Governance Code states that “[c]ommittee chairs should seek engagement
with shareholders on significant matters related to their areas of
responsibility”.90 Moreover, the Guidance on Board Effectiveness elaborated
by the FRC recommends that “[w]hen called upon, the senior independent
director should seek to meet a sufficient range of major shareholders in order
to develop a balanced understanding of their views. Non-executive directors
should take opportunities such as attendance at general and other meetings,
to understand the concerns of shareholders”.91 As far as the role of the senior
independent director is concerned, the Guidance also recommends that “[t]he
senior independent director should also be available to shareholders if they
88. Similarly, for the United States Business Roundtable, Principles of Corporate Governance at 26,
(2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/Principles-of-Corporate-Governance-2016.pdf (stating that
“[d]irect communication between directors and shareholders should be coordinated through — and with
the knowledge of — the board chair, the lead independent director, and/or the nominating/corporate
governance committee or its chair”).
89. UK Corporate Governance Code, supra note 24, at 4.
90. Id. See also FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, GUIDANCE ON BOARD EFFECTIVENESS 11 (2018),
https://www.frc.org.uk/directors/corporate-governance-and-stewardship/uk-corporate-governancecode/frc-guidance-for-boards-and-board-committees (“the chairs of the audit, remuneration and
nomination committees should be available to answer questions at the AGM. The chair should encourage
them to make a statement on the activities and achievements of the committee over the year. This could
include details of engagement with shareholders on significant matters”).
91. Fin. Reporting Council, Guidance on Board Effectiveness, supra note 91 at 11.
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have concerns that contact through the normal channels of chair, chief
executive or other executive directors has failed to resolve or for which such
contact is inappropriate”.92
Selecting participants in dialogue on behalf of the company is more
complex in Italy, where the Consolidated Act on Finance (Testo Unico della
Finanza) requires that at least one member of the board be elected by
minority shareholders by means of the so-called slate system for electing
directors.93 Therefore, as regards the boards of Italian listed companies, a
distinction is necessary between executive and non-executive-independent
directors on the one hand and directors elected by the majority or
respectively the minority on the other hand. This peculiar feature of the
current Italian regulations of corporate governance raises the question as to
whether directors drawn from the minority slate are allowed to make contact
directly the minority shareholders that elected them. Since minority slates
are usually presented by institutional investors, the establishment of a direct
channel of communication with minority-elected directors would entail
granting institutional investors direct and permanent access to the board.
Guidance concerning the role of directors elected by the minority is provided
by the Italian Stewardship Principles, which were significantly overhauled
in 2016.
Under the previous version of the Principle No. 3, any institutional
investors that had significant concerns regarding the strategy and
performance of investee listed issuers were encouraged to intervene by
requesting a meeting with the management and/or the auditors (the
chairperson of the administrative body, executive directors, the lead
independent director, the chairperson of the auditing body or independent
directors elected by investment management companies and institutional
investors, where present)94 More specifically, according to the Principles as
previously applicable, discussion with independent minority members of the
board was viewed as a valid form of intervention and active communication
for institutional investors, provided that: it was carried out within an
organized and collective procedure; it occurred upon request by minority
members of the board, or on the initiative of institutional investors, provided
in the latter case that a meeting had previously been held with the
chairperson, executive directors, or the lead independent director of the
investee issuer.
These recommendations raised concerns among issuers, who
considered that they were not fully in line with international practice. In fact,
the Italian Stewardship Principles allowed minority members of the board to
engage in dialogue directly with the institutional investors who had elected
92. Id. at 20.
93. See Giovanni Strampelli, How to Enhance Directors’ Independence at Controlled Companies,
44 J. CORP. L. 103, 132-138 (2018).
94. See
ASSOGESTIONI,
ITALIAN
STEWARDSHIP
PRINCIPLES
17
(2015),
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/codes/documents/principi_it_stewardship_settembre2015_en.pdf
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them without even any requirement to request the other board members, the
auditing body, or other managers whether they wished to participate in the
meetings concerned.
Also following these criticisms, Italian Stewardship Principle No. 3 was
reviewed in 2016. At present, the reviewed version of Principle No. 3
recommends that institutional investors meet with the chairman of the board,
the executive directors, the lead independent director, the chairperson of the
auditing body, the chairperson of an internal committee or other independent
directors, including minority members, taking account also of the allocation
of functions within corporate bodies. Furthermore, the Principle makes it
clear that dialogue between directors and institutional investors should be
conducted according to an organized and collective procedure which, among
other things, ensures compliance with the general principle of no limits in
terms of the mandate granted by the shareholders who proposed or approved
the candidacy.
The review of the Italian Stewardship Principles must be viewed
positively. The revised version of Stewardship Principle No. 3 seems
appropriately to favour more effective dialogue between the board and
institutional investors. The selection of the board’s minority members
involved in dialogue is no longer dependent on the nominating shareholders
but on the roles performed by the director concerned (e.g. committee chair),
in line with international best practice.95 Thus, the reviewed version of
Principle No. 3 prohibits minority-elected directors from meeting privately
with the shareholders who proposed or approved their candidacy, unless
other board members or representatives of the company are involved. The
Italian experience offers an insight that may be repeated in other
jurisdictions, such as the US, that allow minority shareholders to elect board
members.96
Having said that, two additional points must be made regarding the
selection of board members involved in dialogue with institutional
shareholders. First, director-institutional shareholder dialogue should avoid
information asymmetries within the board. It is therefore crucial that all
board members be informed in good time concerning any dialogue with
institutional investors. In this respect, as clearly stated by the Italian
Corporate Governance Code,97 a key role should be played by the board’s
95. The Shareholder-Director Exchange, Introduction and SDX Protocol 14 (2014),
http://www.sdxprotocol.com/what-is-the-sdx-protocol/ (“The company will specify participating
directors based on the specific topic(s) to be discussed. Participants will be chosen based on experience,
expertise, board role, and past relationship with the investor. The independent non-executive chairman,
lead director, or relevant board committee chair will be one of the attendees.”).
96. See, e.g., JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 50–51 (3d ed. 2017). (For an overview of national rules allowing minority
shareholders to appoint their representatives).
97. GOVERNANCE COMM., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 29, at 6 (stating that “[t]he
chair ensures that the board of directors is in any case informed, within the first suitable meeting, of the
development and the significant contents of the dialogue that has taken place with all the shareholders”).
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chair. The possibility for an individual board member to engage in direct
dialogue with the shareholders that proposed or approved his/her election
can restrict the board’s cohesiveness and undermine trust among directors.98
Second, whilst a flexible approach is theoretically preferable, allowing for
case by case decisions as to which non-executive directors should be
involved in the dialogue based on the issues to be discussed, an individual
board member should only ever privately meet with institutional
shareholders in exceptional cases.99 Where the chairperson of the board and
the lead independent director cannot take part to the meeting with
institutional investors, or where it is appropriate that they not be involved, or
where institutional investors request dialogue with other non-executive
independent directors, the non-executive board member selected should
meet the shareholders along with a company manager, usually the person
responsible for investor relations. This is useful in order to avoid that
director-shareholder dialogue giving rise to information asymmetries within
the board, and to restrict the risk of breaching insider and market abuse rules.
C. POLICY ON DIRECTOR-SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS
The format and subject matter of dialogue with shareholders should
ideally be decided on a case by case by the directors, based on a variety of
factors including, for example, the appropriateness of the proposed topic, the
specific investors asking for the meeting and their approach to investment
and corporate governance.100 However, many issuers adopt a policy on
director-shareholder communication that regulates the same issues on a predetermined basis.101 For example, as regards the process by which
shareholders can request direct dialogue with the board, policies define
which directors must be involved in dialogue, and which topics must be
discussed. In addition, many corporate governance experts recommend the
adoption of a policy on director-shareholder dialogue, as this helps to

98. It is questionable whether dialogue with shareholders needs a prior agreement of the whole
board. See HOPT, supra note 10, at 12 (arguing that “[t]he chairman will be well advised to secure an
informal general agreement of the board for having such dialogues with investors. On the other hand,
having to seek agreement for each individual dialogue and even having to obtain a formal board resolution
for this would be too much and cannot be seen as being required by the law. In any case, if the board does
not oppose the dialogue, it is up to the chairman of the board to have the dialogue with the investors since
the chairman represents the board in the public”).
99. See Catherine Bromilow et al., Director Dialogue with Shareholders, CORP. BOARD 3 (May–
June 2014), https://www.weil.com/~/. . ./directordialoguewithshareholders.pdf.
100. THE SHAREHOLDER-DIRECTOR EXCHANGE, supra note 95, para. 2.
101. For the U.S. See Tonello & Gatti, supra note 10. (Noting that formal, written policies for
companies to regulate board shareholder engagement are more commonly seen among larger firms and
have become prevalent in the financial sector. When adopted, these policies most frequently state: how
investors can solicit an interaction with corporate directors; the allocation of engagement responsibilities
among the board, the investor relations function, and other members of the senior management team; who
at the board level is expected to lead the engagement process; and the topics on which the engagement is
permitted. Detailed engagement calendars are seldom included.).
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increase shareholder awareness as to how the company enters into dialogue
and what its expectations are.102
Nevertheless, it would be useful if corporate governance codes were to
recommend the adoption and disclosure of a policy on director-shareholder
dialogue. In this respect, the Dutch regulatory approach may be taken as a
reference. Article 4.2.2 of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code
recommends that “the company should formulate an outline policy on
bilateral contacts with the shareholders and should post this policy on its
website”. In keeping with the comply or explain mechanism, the company
must provide a substantive and transparent explanation when it does not
adopt such a policy. The Dutch Code does not regulate the contents of the
policy, but in most cases practice shows that the policy applies to procedural
aspects and the format of dialogue. For example, the policy on bilateral
contacts with the shareholders adopted by Heineken (a Dutch leading
brewing company) states that
Conversations with shareholders in general take place in Annual General
Meetings of Shareholders, but may also be held on a bilateral basis or in
(small) groups. Heineken determines at its sole discretion whether it
accepts invitations to engage in bilateral contacts with shareholders.
Heineken takes into consideration all reasonable requests from
shareholders. The initiative to enter into a conversation with a shareholder
can also be taken by Heineken. Heineken may request a shareholder to
provide certain written information prior to a bilateral conversation in
order to assess whether a conversation outside an Annual General Meeting
of Shareholders would be in the interest of Heineken. This information
may include the objective of the conversation, the matters to be discussed,
the opinion of the shareholder on these matters and information in respect
of the shareholder and its interest in Heineken. Heineken is generally
represented by its Investor Relations Director during these interactions.
However, in a limited number of occasions, one or more members of
senior management and the Executive Board of Heineken may accompany
the Investor Relations Director. In some circumstances, the Investor
Relations Director may delegate the interaction with a shareholder to the
Investor Relations Manager. The subject matter of bilateral
communications ranges from individual queries from shareholders to
more elaborate discussions following Heineken disclosures, such as its
annual and interim reports. In principle, Heineken holds no meetings with
any shareholders during silent periods.103
102. Supra note 99, at 3.
103. See HEINEKEN N.V., POLICY ON BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THE SHAREHOLDERS 2-3 (2018),
https://www.theheinekencompany.com/sites/theheinekencompany/files/investor/governance/policies/He
ineken-N.V.-Policy-on-bilateral-contacts-with-shareholders-Heineken-NV.pdf. (Following the model of
the Dutch Code, a similar recommendation is provided by the Italian Corporate Governance code,
according to which “Upon proposal of the chair in agreement with the chief executive officer, the board
of directors adopts and describes in the corporate governance report a policy for managing dialogue with
the generality of shareholders, taking also into account the engagement policies adopted by institutional
investors and asset managers”.). See CORP. GOVERNANCE COMM., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE,
supra note 29, at 6.
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In order to favour effective dialogue with institutional shareholders,
corporate governance experts further recommend that issuers disclose their
engagement activities, including specifying which directors were involved,
what topics were discussed and what action the board has taken in response
to institutional shareholders’ concerns.104
Issuers could report on which shareholders, and with what frequency,
they entered into dialogue, and disclose a very short description of the
contents of discussions, considering that a wider disclosure could result in
an excessive administrative burden and discourage activist shareholders.105
Specifically, the board should, on a quarterly or semi-annually basis, disclose
certain standard details concerning the meeting, such as the identity of the
counterparty, the date, and the start and end times, along with a brief
description of the corporate purpose of the meeting, should be supported.106
Following the example of the market soundings regime outlined by Article
11 MAR, issuers could also be required to keep records of their meetings
with shareholders. Disclosing information concerning board-shareholder
dialogue would benefit all shareholders (including retail shareholders),107
since it would secure an awareness of the identity of shareholders that have
entered into dialogue with the issuer and facilitate enforcement of the
MAR.108

V. CONCLUSION
Within a corporate governance landscape characterized by the growing
importance of institutional shareholder engagement, board-shareholder
dialogue is becoming an increasingly common practice in Europe. Boardshareholder dialogue is essential in order to enable institutional investors to
fulfil their stewardship functions. Board-shareholder engagement is also core
to listed companies’ communication strategies, since the growing demand
for engagement by institutional investors has rendered traditional investor
relations insufficient.
Nevertheless, director-shareholder dialogue occurs within an area of
tension between corporate governance trends and financial markets law.
104. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, DIRECTOR-SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT: GETTING IT RIGHT
6-7 (2020), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/governance-insights-center/publications/assets/pwc-directorshareholder-engagement-getting-it-right.pdf .
105. Martin Bengtzen, Private Investor Meetings in Public Firms: The Case for Increasing
Transparency, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 33, 122-126 (2017).
106. Id., at 125 (arguing that “from the perspective of the recipients, the publicity of the fact that they
have met management should be a small price to pay for an information advantage provided by the firm
and indirectly paid for by its shareholders as a group”). See also Solomon & Soltes, supra note 13, at
353-354 (pointing out that “[o]ne possible solution is to publicly publish a transcript of these private
interactions as firms currently provide for quarterly earnings conference calls with analysts”).
107. Solomon & Soltes, supra note 13, at 353-354 (“[s]uch a practice would continue to facilitate
private meetings but also allow all market participants access to the information being disclosed
regardless of their ability to gain private access”).
108. Supra note 105, at 128-129.
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Private meetings between directors and institutional investors raise concerns
with respect to the financial markets law framework in the EU, as they may
lead to the disclosure of material non-public information to selected
shareholders. In particular, the EU market abuse regime seems to hinder
dialogue between directors and key shareholders as it requires the disclosure
of inside information, and prohibits anyone receiving inside information
from trading in the issuers’ securities.
However, legal constraints deriving from EU financial markets law
should not be overstated, as they do not definitely prohibit board-shareholder
dialogue. First, insider trading and disclosure rules only apply to the
communication of material non-public information. Therefore, as has been
recognized by European lawmakers, they do not hamper dialogue as long as
it does not concern inside information. Furthermore, when fulfilling their
stewardship functions, institutional investors are primarily interested in
communicating their views or concerns to investee companies and do not
want to receive material non-public information so that they may freely trade
securities issued by investee companies. Recommendations from corporate
governance and stewardship codes, as well as good practice standards
drafted by corporate governance experts and institutions, outline a practical
framework that reduces the risk of violating disclosure rules and favours
board-shareholder engagement. However, the provisions of codes and
statements of best practice are not binding, as issuers and institutional
investors are free to decide not to adopt them, and stipulate only a limited
safe harbour. Judges and supervisory authorities can take action against
issuers and institutional investors based on alleged breaches of the disclosure
and insider trading legal framework.
Incentives for directors’ and institutional investors to engage could be
enhanced were the European Regulators to provide directors and investors
with more detailed guidance concerning the topics that can be discussed
within board-shareholder dialogue, and the precautionary measures that
could be adopted. Whilst this would not establish a safe harbour, it could
help to promote board-shareholder engagement by limiting compliance costs
for both issuers and institutional investors.

